Chapter 3 Consciousness Explained

Chapter 3 Consciousness Explained

In the introduction, we noted that contemporary studies on consciousness are multidisciplinary and draw on research in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. These different disciplines lead to completely different questions, just as the answers provided will be diverse. Thus, cognitive psychologists consider mental processes as information processing tools that allow it to be recorded, stored, transformed, and restored. A study such as that of memory, for example, can be seen as the observation of an information processing process that would go from encoding to storing and restoring memories. Cognitive psychology is primarily interested in functional analysis and not in how mental processes are physically carried out in the brain. Conversely, biological psychology is interested in how these functions are physically carried out at the biological level of the brain or body. They may also study questions such as the evolutionary cause of a mental process or how biology influences processes, such as brain damage or human development. Philosophers, on the other hand, question whether the conceptualization of a mental function is appropriate. They may develop arguments and test them through experiments to examine the coherence of a conceptualization. They may draw conclusions from a point of view, perhaps by demonstrating that a position leads to counterintuitive or incorrect predictions. Philosophers may also be interested in the adequacy, or otherwise, of existing explanations.

Visit different approaches involve different criteria of evaluation. Whereas cognitive and biological psychology make empirical assumptions about consciousness, the brain, and behavior, philosophers argue that some modes of theorizing and conceptualization are more appropriate than others. The assumptions of cognitive and biological psychologists can thus be examined empirically, that is, the assumptions are investigated by collecting new empirical data. If the data contradict or do not confirm the assumptions, we can conclude that the assumptions need to be modified. Philosophical studies are conducted through logical arguments and conjectures and through studies of several possible scenarios, such as the thought experiments we have already discussed. Of course, this is a simplified picture. Psychologists often make assumptions that are not empirical—in the case where it would be impossible to collect data that could decide whether a hypothesis is true or false—just as philosophers often make empirical assumptions. This is why the boundaries between the two disciplines are much more porous than they seem at first glance.

You might wonder why there are so many different disciplines, institutions, conferences, journals, books, or funding opportunities focused on the question of consciousness. To answer this, we must remember the historical and political context of these intellectual endeavors, but there are also practical reasons. On the one hand, it takes an enormous amount of time to study all the literature on a particular topic, especially for a single individual trying to approach a problem from different perspectives. On the other hand, the study of consciousness has become multidisciplinary because researchers have finally realized that the problems posed by the study of consciousness are multifaceted.

Cognitive psychologists have made progress in understanding mental processes, although the examples I have given show that their role in information processing is not entirely clear. Perhaps most troubling is the problem of the physical medium of consciousness, a recurring problem since Descartes. If Descartes was correct in suggesting that the mind has a fundamentally different constitution from the rest of the physical universe, then consciousness appears to be beyond any scientific explanation. In our age of astonishing scientific progress, observations such as these have encouraged researchers from different disciplines to work together toward a unified understanding of consciousness.

This chapter attempts to show what the ingredients of a unified explanation of consciousness might be. Although other perspectives will later help to complete our understanding of consciousness, much progress has already been made in bridging the views of cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers. All claim to be able to explain a wide range of empirical data. However, it is clear that our theoretical understanding of consciousness, rather than a lack of empirical data, needs our full attention. Therefore, this chapter focuses primarily on the theoretical account of consciousness that emerges from these studies rather than how they explain empirical data.

We will therefore study several philosophical approaches. We will also be interested in how these different perspectives relate to each other. There are obviously other views than those developed by psychology, biology, or philosophy. Just as there are different theories in psychology with particular links between them (complementarity, coexistence, etc.), it is likely that the disciplines we will study do not have a unique relationship between them. A particular philosophical approach, for example, may complement a particular cognitive approach while another view would conflict with it. This is why I will use some characteristics of these theories as examples in order to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to consciousness and to get an idea of how psychology relates to other disciplines.

The Cognitive Perspective: Global Workspace Theory

Bernard Baars (1988) proposed a cognitive theory of consciousness in which the Consciousness would appear as a result of the interconnection between a number of cognitive processes, such as perception, attention, language and memory. The essence of Baars's theory is that consciousness presupposes a shared workspace which can receive a certain amount of data from many specialized processors, which operate non-consciously. There are limits to this workspace, but everything stored there emerges into our consciousness. The contents of consciousness then correspond to what exists in the workspace. Baars' model contains a number of basic elements:

• specialized incoming processors. These process information unconsciously and in parallel. Each processor is dedicated to a particular type of information. For example, some are dedicated to perception, others to language, and so on. Each processor processes information efficiently, but only within its domain.
• A global workspace. Everything that appears in this workspace is in consciousness. The workspace would resemble a whiteboard on a website or in a classroom. It is a place where different non-conscious processors can 'write' the results of their processing, and thus communicate and share information with other processors. This communication would allow a certain degree of coordination and cooperation between the different processors. However, only a small number of messages can appear in the workspace at any given time because this space is limited in capacity. Multiple messages can only be displayed sequentially, at a time. Some will need to be cleared before others can be displayed.
• Specialized outgoing processors. Information stored in the global workspace can be sent to specialized outbound processors. Thus, the contents of the global workspace can change how processors process information. Note, however, that the workspace is not active. It does not direct information processing. Rather, the workspace would be a memory where the various outbound processors can find information. These outbound processors are also specialized, efficient in terms of information processing, and operate in parallel.

The components of the Baars model have characteristics which are as follows:

• Lcomputational inefficiency refers to the fact that conscious processes are incapable of performing very large or complex calculations. Most of us, for example, will find it difficult to perform long division in our heads. Our visual processes are capable of performing much more complex operations from the images that are imprinted on our retina.
• Consciousness has a wide range of possible content. I can simultaneously be aware of my schedule for tomorrow, the buzzing of a bee outside my window, and the conscious execution of a culinary dish. There seems to be no limit to the kinds of things our consciousness can attend to. On the contrary, our non-conscious processes appear to be very specific in terms of the contents on which they operate.. Whatever processes we have available to analyze a visual stimulus, they are likely dedicated to that task only. They are unlikely to be involved in processing information from other senses or to be involved in anything other than vision, such as solving a physical problem. Non-conscious processors are modules that operate only in relation to a specialized type of information: the visual perception module will only process incoming visual information.
• It seems that consciousness must be coherent, unlike non-conscious processors, which can produce mutually irreconcilable results. For example, as with the two possible interpretations of the Necker cube, non-conscious processes of visual perception can produce conflicting results: it is difficult to identify which points define the front of the cube. Thus, consciousness would need these inconsistencies to be resolved: in full consciousness, we are obliged to 'see' the cube in only one way at a time.
• Consciousness would operate in a way sequential whereas non-conscious processors operate simultaneously or in parallel. It is as if consciousness can be directed at only one or a few things at a time. Although it can be directed at several different things, this must be done sequentially over a short period of time.

The image above shows how different processors interact via the global workspace. Specialized processors operate in parallel, relatively independently, and each in a specific domain. Each processor presents information to this global workspace. However, all information entering this space must be consistent. If different processors present competing information, they will not be able to enter the workspace. Furthermore, there is a constraint on the amount of information that can be stored in this space. If it is full, additional information can only be added by deleting other information.

Once the information is stored in the workspace, it is then sent globally to the specialized processors and can thus influence their behavior. Baars compares this dissemination of information to the work of a committee where individuals come together to find the solution to a problem they cannot solve alone. Thus, the dissemination of information strengthens cooperation between independent processors.

This theory is presented as a way to reconcile different concepts or very different metaphors. One of them is activation: Researchers have thought that consciousness involves certain aspects of the mind, such as memory or perception, becoming more active than others, possibly beyond a certain threshold; only those elements more active than this threshold would become conscious. This theory draws on studies of perception and memory that rely on the concept of activation.

A second concept is the novelty Consciousness would also be necessary to appropriate new objects or react to new situations. Nonconscious processes operate in a rigid and fixed way; while this is fine for highly predictable situations, an organism's success in dealing with new situations or objects will depend on its ability to identify original and appropriate behaviors. Consciousness has often been seen as the primary means by which this can be done.

A third concept supporting Baars's theory is that of nonconscious processes: psychologists have accumulated a significant amount of evidence on the operations carried out by nonconscious processes such as perception, language or memory.

Baars' theory helps us explain the different aspects of consciousness. We can see quite simply how this theory helps explain the phenomenon of access to consciousness: Specialized processors process incoming information from our various senses; if this sensory information is consistent with the information held by other processors, this information will be stored in the global workspace, in other words, it will become conscious. We can thus understand how perception can lead to awareness: Specialized perceptual processors would process sensory information and eventually, this information would be stored in the global workspace. The diffusion of the same information to other processors would then allow this perceptual information to be processed in a complementary way, perhaps by a language processor, so that the perception can be communicated to other processing processes.

The “consciousness control” function (monitoring consciousness) can be explained in a similar way. Specialized processors that guide action, for example, can send their results to the workspace. As long as there are no conflicting messages received from other processors, these results can be broadcast. Broadcasting may be sufficient to ensure that any additional processing needed to complete a complex sequence of actions occurs. In the context of the errors noted by Reason, it is possible that at a critical moment in the action there are too many competing messages wanting to enter the global workspace; or it is also possible that the critical message is too small to exceed the threshold.

Baars refined his model by showing how the various senses of the self can be incorporated into it in such a way that aspects of self-consciousness can be explained. However, it seems that his explanation of phenomenal consciousness is not very clear: How, for example, information about taste transmitted by a specialized processor to the workspace and then broadcast could explain what coffee tastes like? How can a feeling or experience arise from this process? Baars does not really provide an answer, and in its absence, we can conclude that Baars' theory does not explain phenomenal consciousness.

Biological approach: main and extended consciousness

Antonio Damasio developed a theory of consciousness based on the understanding of humans as biological organisms. Damasio proposes three distinct types of self that would explain the different types of consciousness. First, there is what Damasio calls the proto-selfFor Damasio, our proto-self is what gives us a sense of stability, the feeling that despite changes, we remain the same entity. William James developed this aspect of consciousness. He saw consciousness in terms of a tension between what appears to be a continuous flow of current and an invariant sense of self that experiences this permanent change. Although our conscious experience can change radically from one moment to the next, our sense of self, on the other hand, never changes. Damasio proposed that this sense of instability can be explained by the invariance of the organization and structure of our bodies. Although our bodies change significantly over the course of our lives, 'the design of our bodies remains largely unchanged' (Damasio, 1999). Bones, muscles, organs, all perform a given function, hour by hour, year by year. Moreover, the body has mechanisms by which stability is reinforced. Here we find the notion of homeostasis, which is the tendency for certain parameters of the body to remain stable thanks to mechanisms that restore the parameters to their normal values when they deviate from them. For example, body temperature is regulated. When we are too cold, we take action, for example, by turning on the heating or dressing warmly. Sometimes the need to restore bodily parameters to their normal stable level can invade our consciousness, making us think of nothing but being warm.

The brain contains what we might call somatosensory mechanisms; these mechanisms allow the brain to receive information from different parts of the body and thus maintain a global image of the body's state. For Damasio, the proto-self is a collection of the brain's representations of the body and thus prefigures 'the state of the physical structure of our organism'. (Damasio, 1999).

The proto-self is not accessible to consciousness but, as we have seen, it constitutes its precursor. The proto-self would thus be a neuronal representation of the state of the body. Because it is not conscious, however, we should not confuse it with other types of consciousness studied previously.

For Damasio, consciousness arises from the relationship between two kinds of neural patterns. For him, there are neural patterns in the brain that represent the organism, organic representations which, as we have seen, are described as proto-selves. He also believes that there are neural patterns that represent the external world: external representations produced by perceptual mechanisms. Because these are object-like representations, Damasio calls them first-level representations. The core self then arises from another set of neural patterns. This set of patterns represents the relationship between the two first-level representations. Damasio calls them second-level representations; he could have called them meta-representations. These second-level patterns thus represent the changes in the proto-self that occur during the formation of external representations. External representations would include sensorimotor information (representing, for example, different actions of the object) and their formation leads to changes in the organism's representations, i.e. the proto-self.

Although technical, Damasio's approach may seem simplistic. Suppose we see a ball coming towards us at a certain speed. A perceptual process of the ball takes place, such that representations of the external world are formed. In particular, the world is represented as including a ball moving towards the body. As a result of this representation, bodily changes occur. This may lead to preparation for an appropriate action. Muscles may begin to contract, for example. Because our body begins to change, the proto-self changes in parallel, since the proto-self represents the state of the body. For Damasio, primary consciousness is involved in representing the relationship between these bodily changes and external representations of the world. The second-level models that represent these relationships capture something of the relationship between the body and its environment.

Finally, Damasio believes that there is an autobiographical self and an extended consciousness, a consequence of the long-term storage of the contents of the main consciousnessThe organism is said to possess an extended sense of self, developing over a lifetime through plans and expectations, anticipating the future. When these stored contents are brought into the mainstream consciousness along with a representation of a particular object, then extended consciousness is at work. This allows us to think of an object not only in terms of the here and now, but also in a broader context. This notion of the autobiographical self takes us back to studies on autobiographical memory and identity.

There are a number of striking features in Damasio's theory. His approach to primary consciousness helps us understand why objects in our environment seem to control our awareness. If the primary consciousness consists of representations about how the organism changes in response to objects in the environment, then this predominance is less surprising.

Damasio's theory also offers an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Perhaps the 'feeling' (diffuse feeling or impression) associated with consciousness is due to the change in the proto-self, or the 'feeling' of how our bodily representations change with perceptual experience. The notion of extended consciousness helps us understand self-awareness.

This theory also offers an explanation for Williams James's divergent views of consciousness. The neural patterns that constitute our core consciousness are, by nature, evolutionary: they change with the organism's changing perception of the external world. A sequence of such patterns forms a continuous and constantly changing flow, as suggested by James. However, the autobiographical self, which is based on the long-term storage of information about the organism's history, provides a stable sense of self.

Damasio's theory is also reinforced by many neuropsychological observations. Patients with various types of disorders appear to act in accordance with Damasio's descriptive schemata of consciousness. He thus explains amnesia, anosognosia, and asomatognosia as disorders of the autobiographical self. Automatism is also explained in terms of a disorder of the primary consciousness. Finally, Damasio developed detailed proposals for how these various components of consciousness physically exist in different regions of the brain.

Despite these positive points, there is an obvious difficulty. We have already discussed the problem of the relationship between consciousness and physical matter. Although Damasio attempted to resolve this problem, a closer examination of his theory shows that this is not the case. Damasio says that primary consciousness arises from the relationship between the organism's representations and its representation of the external world. However, he tells us nothing about how this happens. How does a feeling or experience arise from these representations? It is as if at a crucial moment in the theoretical explanation, just when we feel that we are finally going to understand how consciousness actually arises, we are then told that 'it arises somewhere from its representations.' This is obviously not a valid explanation. Although presented as a theory of consciousness, this theory does not actually resolve the heart of the matter. Rather, it should be presented as a theory of self-consciousness, of the steering function of consciousness, or of access to consciousness, but not as an explanation of phenomenal consciousness.. In fact, Damasio is aware of this when he says: "I am open to criticism that I am only interested in the problem of what is called self-consciousness and that I leave aside other aspects of the problem." (Damasio, 1999). Unfortunately, without an explanation of how consciousness arises from representations, these criticisms seem valid.