Chapter 4 Consciousness Explained?

Chapter 4: Consciousness Explained?

In previous chapters, we discussed cognitive neurological and psychological theories of consciousness. In this chapter, we will focus on philosophers' attempts to explain it. One reason is that none of the theories we have presented so far explains the following intuition: consciousness involves something like a diffuse feeling, emotion, or experience, or as Nagel would say, something like being conscious. In fact, we could have studied many other propositions about consciousness, but this intuition would still be a stumbling block. Why?

1. The “hard problem” of consciousness

Chalmers (1995, 1996) suggests that explaining consciousness presents a number of difficulties, but one of the greatest is explaining how experience (feeling or phenomenal consciousness) arises from a physical basis. This is known as the problem of qualia, a term used to describe individual feelings or experiences. For example: What is it like to drink a cup of coffee?

Searle (1999) identifies three characteristics of conscious states: they are internalized, qualitative, and subjective. This subjective nature poses a problem: we cannot objectively observe what it feels like to be in a conscious state. The very fact that conscious states are qualitative (they involve feeling) makes their external observation difficult. Finally, their subjectivity reinforces the difficulty of proposing an objective and scientific explanation.

Nagel (1974) speaks of the “first-person” character of consciousness: there is always an “I” who is experiencing. This implies a particular point of view, which makes it difficult to conceive of an objective theory. For example, a bat perceives the world through sonar—we can never truly understand what it feels like to be a bat.

2. Does phenomenal consciousness really exist?

Dennett's position

Daniel Dennett (1991) takes a radically different position. According to him, phenomenal consciousness does not exist. He proposes that the mind is a series of specialized processors operating in parallel. Although this resembles Baars's theory, Dennett denies the very existence of feelingAccording to him, language can mislead us: we believe that there is a qualitative internal experience, when it is only a conceptual illusion.

Jackson's Thought Experiment

Frank Jackson's thought experiment (1982) seeks to prove the opposite. He imagines Mary, a scientist who knows everything about colors, but lives in a black and white world. When she sees the color red for the first time, does she learn anything new? Many believe yes: she learns what it do to see red. This demonstrates, according to Jackson, that there is an aspect of the experience that escapes physical explanation. For Dennett, on the other hand, this experience is flawed, because it is impossible to conceive of what a perfect knowledge of the physics of colors would be.

3. Consciousness as a fundamental property?

Chalmers' position

Chalmers proposes that conscious experience is a fundamental feature of the universe, like mass or electric charge. He proposes the experience of zombie : a molecularly identical human clone, but without consciousness. Is this conceivable? If so, it means that consciousness does not automatically arise from physical structure. This suggests that there is something more to the experience.

Real cases as examples

Cases such as Ken Parkes (who committed murder while sleepwalking) or blindsight (patients capable of perceiving without being aware of it) reinforce this hypothesis: these individuals act as if they were conscious, but without being so subjectively. This suggests that consciousness does not result solely from brain activity.

Chalmers' Reviews

However, his theory raises objections. How can non-conscious objects (neurons, chairs) produce consciousness? And what does it really mean that experience is a fundamental trait? These ideas remain unclear and controversial.

4. Mysterianism: an impossible explanation?

Colin McGinn argues that consciousness exceeds our cognitive abilities. Just as animals cannot understand certain realities, we would not be able to understand our own. According to this approach, consciousness can never be explained scientifically.

5. Conclusion: towards a new conceptualization?

Cognitive, biological, and philosophical approaches demonstrate the magnitude of the challenge. While access to consciousness, the control function, and self-awareness can be described by science, phenomenal consciousness seems to elude explanation.

On the one hand, one can deny its existence (Dennett's position) by attributing it to a conceptual error. On the other hand, one can admit it but recognize that it exceeds current scientific explanations (Chalmers, McGinn).

In any case, consciousness research remains open. It requires multidisciplinary perspectives, a rethinking of our theoretical models, and perhaps a new way of thinking about the relationship between mind and matter.