Chapter 4 Consciousness Explained?

In previous chapters we have discussed cognitive neurological and psychological theories of consciousness. In this chapter, we will look at the attempts at explanations made by philosophers. One reason is that none of the theories we have presented so far explains the following intuition, namely that Consciousness involves something like a diffuse feeling, emotion, or experience, or as Nagel would say, something like being conscious. In fact, we could have studied many other propositions about consciousness, but this intuition would still be a stumbling block. Why?

Chalmers (1995, 1996) suggests that explaining consciousness presents a number of difficulties, but that one of the major difficulties is explaining how experience (feeling or phenomenal consciousness) arises from a physical basis. This is sometimes known as the qualia problem, a term used by philosophers to describe the individual feelings or experiences referred to when we speak of phenomenal consciousness. For example, we have already discussed the nature of the qualia associated with drinking a cup of coffee. The problem is essentially the same as the one that Descartes raised in the 17th century: how can we explain the relationship between a conscious mind and a material body? Why is this problem so difficult to solve?

Searle (1999) underlines three aspects of our conscious experience: conscious states are internalized, qualitative, and subjective. They are internalized because conscious processes take place within the person and because they exist within the context of a flow of conscious processes, as described by James. Conscious states are qualitative because each of them has a qualitative character, that is to say, each state corresponds to a way in which one feels in this state. In Nagel's terminology, there is something which is like being in a conscious state. Finally, conscious states are subjective because there is always a need for a subject, that is, a person to experiment them.

The problem is particularly difficult to solve for three reasons. To develop an objective, scientific theory of phenomenal consciousness or qualia, we need to understand "what it is like" to be in a conscious state. And the fact that conscious states are internalized poses severe difficulties. We cannot objectively observe what it is like to be in a conscious state for others ; we can only suppose it. Which brings up the second difficulty: phenomenal consciousness is qualitative; it is a feeling or an experience, and iThere are few or no outward signs in people's behavior to indicate the nature of this experience. The subjective nature of conscious states leads to a final difficulty. Many researchers have argued that studying consciousness objectively implies ignoring its subjective nature. For Nagel (1974), consciousness has one essential feature. This is sometimes described as a 'first-person' character (thus referring to the singular personal pronoun 'I'). For him, Consciousness always seems to involve an 'I' experiencing a particular point of view. What is a point of view and why does it pose difficulties for a scientific and objective theory of consciousness? Davies and Humphreys describe a point of view as constituting 'a kind of limitation on what is conceivable for an individual' (Davies and Humphreys, 1993). For example, our perceptual system limits how we see the world. If we were not able to see a visible spectrum, but X-rays, we would have different points of view of the world. Bats, who sailed around the world guided by a kind of sonar echo, probably had a different 'view' of the world. To develop an objective theory of phenomenal consciousness, we would need to understand something from the perspective of other organismsThis may not pose insurmountable problems with humans, although some neuropsychological cases remain difficult to understand. But in the case of completely different organisms such as bats, it is hopeless.

Where are we with our explanation of consciousness? We have seen that explaining phenomenal consciousness is very difficult. Chalmers calls this fact 'hard problem' of consciousness. We have also seen that many theories of consciousness do not explain this problem. Perhaps, as Nagel suggested, the intrinsic "first-person" or perspectival character of consciousness places insurmountable obstacles in the way of an objective theory. How could we objectively describe someone else's conscious experience without describing their point of view? Yet how could we describe that point of view if we are not the subjects of their conscious experience? This does not mean that it is impossible to perceive and understand other people's minds. Only, giving an objective account of someone else's point of view requires much more.

Nagel helps us understand why consciousness is so difficult to understand. Faced with these difficulties in finding explanations, researchers have taken increasingly extreme positions in an attempt to find solutions. We will outline some of his positions. Don't be discouraged if some points are difficult to understand at first glance.

Does phenomenal consciousness exist?

Daniel Dennett, a philosopher, proposes an approach to the problem of consciousness that is very different from that of psychologists such as Baars or Damasio (Dennett, 1991). For the latter, the goal was to find psychological evidence and develop a theory expressed in terms familiar to psychologists (information processing and biological structures). In contrast, Dennett's goal is to examine the very notion of consciousness and to verify whether our conceptualization of it is coherent or not. Its aim is to study whether a theory of consciousness is possible and, if so, what form it would take..

Dennett proposes that the mind consists of a series of specialized processors or circuits all working in parallel. These processors can conflict, even compete. In this respect, his theory of consciousness is very similar to Baars's. However, the two theories differ on one key assumption. Regarding Dennett, he believes that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. For him, some of the intuitions we have already discussed above are mistaken. Although we may be convinced that there is some feeling or experience involved in our consciousness, according to Dennett, we are wrong. In our discussions, we have mentioned the difficulties in exposing what was involved in consciousness as opposed to other processes such as hearing or seeing. But for Dennett, we are only assuming that there is something else, a phenomenal consciousness, beyond these processes, even if this is very difficult to describe.

From this perspective, Dennett's position bears some similarities to our discussion of the importance of language in describing consciousness. We noted that the nature of language can determine the type of conscious experience we have. Thus, it is possible that a Pintupi and a European might have different conscious experiences of a hole in the ground. If we accept the possibility that language determines the nature of our conscious experience, then it is difficult to reject the hypothesis that it is also possible that our language deceives us into thinking that phenomenal consciousness exists when it may not. Thus, Dennett takes an extreme position regarding the role of language in shaping our consciousness.. For him, talking about experience and similar things leads us to the false belief that phenomenal consciousness (feeling and experience) actually exists! Thus, talking about phenomenal consciousness is nothing more than a conceptual confusion that does not stand up to careful analysis.

One decidedly positive consequence of Dennett's theory is that it suggests that theories of consciousness, such as those of Baars or Damasio, may be much more comprehensive than previously thought. Their inability to explain phenomenal consciousness can hardly be criticized if such consciousness does not exist! Thus, if Dennett is right, any or all of these theories may provide a good explanation of consciousness.

Moreover, Dennett's arguments do not actually address our strong intuition that phenomenal consciousness exists. Frank Jackson's experiments in 1982 and described below are intended to show that phenomenal consciousness does indeed exist (although this example was rejected by Dennett):

“Marie is a brilliant scientist who, for some reason, is forced to analyze the world in a black and white room via a black and white television set. She has specialized in the neuropsychology of vision and is collecting, we assume, all the physical information that can be obtained about what happens when we look at ripe tomatoes or the sky, and use terms like red, blue, etc. She has discovered, for example, which combinations of wavelengths from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how the formulation of the following sentence occurs via the central nervous system, the contraction of the vocal cords and the expulsion of air from the lungs: ‘the sky is blue’… What will happen if Marie leaves her black and white room or equips herself with a color television set? Will she learn anything new or not?” (Jackson, 1982)

What do you think? Do you think Mary would learn something about colors that she hasn't yet learned in her monochrome environment? If so, what would she learn? If you think Mary wouldn't learn anything, why do you think so?

Many people think that Mary would learn something when she first saw, say, a red rose or a blue sky. She would already know that the rose is red, but she would be learning for the first time what it is like (in terms of feeling) to experience red. For the first time, she would be able to say what red looks like, or, in other words, what the experience of red is like. Jackson thinks it is obvious that Mary would learn something from experiencing color, and that this demonstrates that conscious experience develops beyond the cognitive and biological mechanisms of the body and brain. After all, since, by hypothesis, Mary holds all the physical information concerning color, her learning somewhere demonstrates that there is more to experience about color than simply the acquisition of information. What can this more be? Phenomenal consciousness.

Jackson's argument is controversial. For Dennett, the experiment is fundamentally flawed. He believes it is simply too difficult for us to imagine and deduce all the implications of someone possessing all the available physical information about color. Yet this thought experiment is extremely useful in trying to clarify the intuition that phenomenal consciousness exists.

Does everyone have phenomenal consciousness?

An alternative and equally foolhardy explanation of consciousness has been suggested by Chalmers. He suggests that phenomenal experience or consciousness is a 'fundamental feature' of the physical universe. What does this mean? Just as mass, electromagnetic charge, space, and time are fundamental features of objects because all objects possess them, Chalmers proposes that they have another feature: experience.

Chalmers' hypothesis is based partly on the following thought experiment (reflection): whether it is conceivable that there are zombies—or molecule-by-molecule replications of human beings—that do not have consciousness.

Zombie Experience

Imagine that there were creatures that not only looked like human beings, but were actually molecule-by-molecule replications of conscious human beings. Suppose also that these creatures acted identically to their human counterparts. Consequently, there would be no way to differentiate these creatures from real human beings. The question then becomes: Is it conceivable that these creatures are not conscious? Would they be zombies without any mental life? What do you think?

If you believe that being non-conscious is unthinkable for these zombies, then you implicitly believe that a molecule-by-molecule replication of a conscious human being would also be conscious. This is tantamount to saying that consciousness is only a product of a person's physical makeup. However, if you believe that a non-conscious zombie is conceivable, then this thought experiment shows that consciousness does not arise from the physical nature of an organism. After all, a human and a zombie may be completely identical in every detail, including their molecular makeup, but the former would be conscious while the latter would not.

The zombie discussion brings us back to our previous discussion of automatisms, sleepwalking, and the unfortunate case of Ken Parkes.

You remember that Ken Parkes exhibited complex behavior consistent with all the different aspects of consciousness we have described. Yet Parks successfully argued that the murder of his stepmother and the injuries inflicted on his stepfather were done without willful intent and unconsciously. Both his physical actions and behavior would correspond to those of a fully conscious, if violent, human being, and yet the court accepted that he was never conscious of his actions and therefore did not act voluntarily or choose his actions. If we accept the court's interpretation of events, we must also accept that during his "sleepwalking" Parks was in the same state as our zombies, namely an absence of the key experience of being conscious. Returning to our earlier discussion of phenomenal consciousness: there is no such thing as "being Ken Parkes sleepwalking" (or a zombie)). He was without phenomenal consciousness. Similarly, in the hypothetical case of blindsight, while the patient can successfully describe a scene perceived in the visual area affected by the scotoma, there is nothing resembling what it would be like to see that scene.

The implications of accepting that Ken Parks was a 'zombie' while sleepwalking, or that patients with blindsight exist, are considerable. The logical implication is that consciousness does not arise directly as a result of brain activity and its physical state. This is a surprising conclusion for those whose position is that all elements of consciousness can be reduced to scientific analysis. Yet, psychologists or philosophers would argue that non-conscious zombies are inconceivable, and that blindsight cannot even be a theoretical hypothesis. Chalmers, however, addresses this problem by suggesting that objects possess, in addition to their fundamental physical traits, fundamental non-physical traits. Substantial criticisms of Chalmers' position have, however, been made.One is to explain how the 'experience of' features of things like the neuron, which is usually considered non-conscious, combine in the brain to give the experience of what we ordinarily call consciousness. Another criticism is to explain how neurons and other physical objects like chairs or tables fail to achieve what we call a conscious state. Perhaps the most difficult problem, however, is how much sense we can make of Chalmers' theory. Researchers have wondered what it really means that experience is a fundamental feature we share with all physical objects. If Chalmers leaves many questions unanswered and somewhat confusing, you are not alone. Perhaps one way to look at his theory is as an extreme, not entirely intelligible option, used to help us approach the hard problem of consciousness, namely that consciousness arises from non-conscious matter.

Will we ever be able to understand phenomenal consciousness?

Another approach to consciousness is known as mysterianism. This is an approach according to which consciousness is not a natural phenomenon, that is, it cannot be studied by scientific methods. Colin McGinn has put forward an explanation for this. According to him, consciousness is a complex subject beyond our understanding. Just as animals will never have the intellectual resources to understand the causes of their behavior, we lack the resources to understand our own consciousness.

The three options we have studied—cognitive, biological, and philosophical—illustrate the different positions adopted in response to the difficulties of explaining consciousness. In essence, these difficulties arise because, although there are reasons to believe in the existence of phenomenal consciousness, it has not been possible to date to establish a satisfactory theory. In fact, there are reasons to believe that if phenomenal consciousness exists, it is not possible to explain it objectively and scientifically. This possibility has presented researchers with a dilemma. While access to consciousness, its controlling function, and self-awareness can be explained by psychological and philosophical theories, phenomenal consciousness seems to elude scientific attempts at explanation, as the mysterianism suggests. It is this far from satisfactory conclusion that has led researchers to suggest new ways of conceptualizing consciousness in order to solve this problem of phenomenal consciousness. Perhaps it is in this context that we should interpret the seemingly extreme positions ofe Dennett and Chalmers.

The options proposed by these two researchers can be broadly classified into two main categories. On the one hand, we can support that phenomenal consciousness does not exist because it cannot be explained in biological or cognitive terms. Talk of phenomenal consciousness might be a way to help us think about people and their behavior, an invention of a particular social, cultural, and linguistic community. This is what Dennett argues, and it brings us back to our discussion of the relationship between consciousness and language. If language seems to shape the nature of our conscious experience, then there is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness, and our way of conceptualizing it would be flawed.

On the other hand, we can decide that Phenomenal consciousness seems to involve something beyond the information we obtain from our biological makeup or cognitive organization. Although there are good arguments for this option, it is difficult to understand what could explain the feeling or experience of. Referring to experience as a fundamental trait does not help us much since it is difficult to define this notion.

Perhaps McGinn's theory is less problematic, but its negative conclusion—that we will never be able to explain consciousness—must be questioned. Whatever attempts are made to explain consciousness, it is clear that this is a field with vast research potential. Almost certainly, discoveries from disciplines other than psychology or medicine, as well as philosophical reexaminations of our conceptualizations, will be key to future progress.